Communism is like Prohibition - it's a good idea but it won't work"
(Will Rogers, 1927) (1)
This essay will give a brief introduction to communism. It will then
discuss the various factors which combined to bring about the collapse of
Communism in Eastern Europe. It will examine each of these factors and
evaluate the effect of each. Finally it will attempt to assertain whether
Rogers' opinion (see above quotation) on Communism is true, that is, whether
communism was truly doomed to fail from the start, or whether its collapse was
a result of external influences.
Communism is based on the ideas and teachings of Karl Marx as modified by
Lenin. At its most basic, the ideal of communism is a system in which everyone
is seen as equal and wealth is distributed equally among the people. There is
no private ownership. The state owns and controls all enterprises and
property. The state is run by one leading elite. The Soviet model of communism
was based on these ideals. All opposition parties were banned although parties
who were sympathetic to communism and who shared the communist ideals were
allowed. All power was concentrated into the hands of the Communist party.
Free press and civil liberties were suppressed. Censorship and propaganda were
widely used. There was state ownership of the economy. No private enterprise
was allowed. There was a collectivisation of agriculture. The Communist Party
invaded and controlled every aspect of political, social, cultural and
economic life. It was a totalitarian state with complete Communist control
over all facets of life. In the early years, and up until Gorbachev's "new
regime", the use of force and terror as a means of maintaining control was
widespread.
The first factor which contributed to the failure and eventual collapse of
communism was the fact that the Communist party's domination was
illegitimate from the beginning. Lenin came to power after a bloody Civil War
between those who supported Lenin and those who opposed the Soviet regime. To
Lenin, defeat was unthinkable and he was prepared to make any and every
sacrifice to win the war and save "the revolution". The forcible
requisitioning of food and supplies was approved by Lenin. This could only be
achieved by enforcing strict and absolute discipline at every level of
society. Terror was to become the chief instrument of power and Lenin was to
assume the role of dictator. This was a phenomenon which was to become a
symbol of communist regimes throughout their lifetime.
This trend was followed when Stalin came to power as leader of the
Communist party and the Russian government in 1929. (2) He had achieved this
through plotting and trickery and by shifting alliances. This had begun in
1924 when Stalin systematically began to remove all opposition to his claim to
power. His main rival was Trotsky and he used a number of underhand measures
to discredit him. For example Stalin lied to Trotsky about the date of Lenin's
funeral, thus ensuring that Trotsky could not attend and thereby blackening
his name in the public eye. This Stalin versus Trotsky conflict led to Trotsky
being eventually exiled from Russia and, ten years later in 1940, being
assassinated by one of Stalin's agents. (3)
Under Stalin any opposition was swiftly and brutally crushed. In no Eastern
European country did the revolution have the support of more than a minority
of people, yet this minority retained absolute control. The communist
take-over and subsequent regime was achieved by undemocratic methods, that is,
rigged elections, terror, totalitarian state, harassment and threats. In 1932
a two-hundred page document by a fellow member of the Politburo condemning the
Stalinist regime and calling for change was published. (4) In response to this
Stalin wreaked a terrible revenge. In 1936 Stalin began what became known as
the "purges" whose function it was to try members of the communist party
who had acted treasonously. (5) The result of these was that five thousand
party members were arrested and stripped of their membership. The sixteen
defendants in the three Showtrials of 1936, 1937 and 1938 were found guilty
and executed. In 1939 those who had conducted the purges were also executed.
By 1939 the only member of Lenin's original Politburo who remained, was
Stalin himself. (6)
In relation to foreign policy, Stalin exerted his influence to ensure that
all Eastern European countries (except Yugoslavia) had Soviet-imposed puppet
regimes. Stalin's domination was now total. After the war Stalin succeeded
in establishing a communist buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe. Any
resistance he met in establishing communist states was quickly suppressed by
intimidation and terror. For example Stalin engineered a communist coup in May
1948 in Czechoslovakia in which a government minister Masaryk was killed and
the president was forced to resign. (7) This served a warning to other
countries against resisting the communist regime.
Therefore it can clearly be seen that from the establishment of the state
that communism never had popular public support. It cannot be denied that
there was a significant minority who supported communism, but these were a
minority. Can an ideal and a leadership really be built on such a shallow and
flimsy basis? This essay would argue that the answer to this question is no.
For a leadership to lead, it must have strong support and confidence. It must
be seen to work for the good of the people and not merely a vociferous
minority. This, therefore, can be argued to be one of the contributing factors
in the downfall of communism.
A second related factor, which had a hand in bringing about the end of
communism in Eastern Europe was the fact that communism never really had the
support of the people. There was constant societal opposition to communist
rule in Eastern Europe. Although this was mainly in the form of a passive
rumbling dissent, there were occasional violent and active shows of opposition
to communist rule. The states of Eastern Europe in the post-war period had
been forced to adhere to the Moscow line. After 1956 however, with Khrushchev's
new approach to Socialism and his denunciation of Stalin, there were
increasing calls for independence among the communist bloc countries who had
never been truly supportive of the communist regime.
In East Germany in 1953 there were a series of strikes and protests. (8)
The Russians, under Stalin, used their armed forces to put down the revolt and
to protect East Germany's communist government. This shows the importance of
Soviet military force in maintaining communism's tenuous grip on power. It
also shows how weak communist rule in East Germany really was. It was this
event that sealed East Germany's fate as the USSR realised that in a united
Germany, the Communists would lose control. Events eventually culminated with
the building of the Berlin Wall which was the ultimate expression of Soviet
and communist force and coercion in maintaining the communist regime.
Under Khrushchev, who had succeeded Stalin after his death in 1953, Poland
was the first to revolt against the communist regime. Polish workers rioted
and went on strike in 1956 and the Polish communist party also revolted by
refusing to accept the Russian general Rokossovsky as the Polish Minister for
Defence. (9) The situation was diffused by a compromise which was made on both
sides, with Poland agreeing to remain in the communist Eastern bloc if the
nationalist communist leader Gomulka, who had been imprisoned by Stalin, was
reinstated. The fact that Khrushchev was willing to compromise illustrates
again the precarious position of communist rule.
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was borne out of the relative success of
the Poles in achieving concessions for the Moscow leadership. (10) The
Hungarians decided to overthrow the Stalinist regime in their country. The
situation quickly deteriorated and on the 23rd of October the Hungarian
troops, who had been dispatched to end the riots, joined the civilians in
revolution. Soviet troops were called in and the Hungarian communist party
lost the little support which they had. Again Khrushchev tried to diffuse the
situation by offering a compromise, that is, the reinstatement of the moderate
communist leader Nagy. When it became clear, however, that Nagy had every
intention of pulling out of the Soviet communist bloc, Khrushchev resorted to
force and violence to maintain the communist grip on Hungary. He ordered the
return of Soviet tanks and troops to Budapest on November 4th 1956. (11)
Thousands were killed in a bloody street battle until the Soviets had
re-established their control. Nagy was arrested and was executed two years
later. A Soviet imposed communist regime under Janos Kadar was set up. (12)
The tenuous communist grip on control is again illustrated here. Khrushchev
was willing to barter, and eventually use force, to maintain Soviet control.
Without this force and coercion, however, Hungary would have established its
own brand of communist rule. Khrushchev could not risk the domino effect that
this action would have had on the Eastern bloc. This societal opposition can,
therefore, be taken to be another contributing factor in the downfall of
communist rule in the Eastern bloc. If those in the alliance cannot cooperate
and work together, the alliance and the ideal cannot hope to survive.
Another important factor which this essay will discuss is that of the
influence of the West on the Eastern bloc. The Eastern bloc was already aware
of Western capitalist success as they were allies during the war. Many of the
Eastern countries, for example Hungary under Nagy or Czechoslovakia under
Dubcek, were in favour of a communist system with some elements of capitalism,
that is, a mixed economy or market socialism and more elements of democracy.
There had been a breakdown in relations between the East and West due to
tensions after WWII. After the war Russia wanted to create a sphere of
influence in the East over which the West would have no say or control. This
was not acceptable to the West who wanted to see democracy installed in the
East and who wanted to have a continued input into the doings of the East.
This conflict eventually led to the Cold War.
Until Khrushchev became leader of the Soviet bloc, there had been no
significant contact between the two blocs. Those inside of the Soviet bloc
were completely cut off from the Western ideals. When Khrushchev came to
power, however, there as renewed hope in the West that there might be a "thaw"
in relations between the two blocs. Relations between the two blocs did
improve with Khrushchev attending a number of conferences and meetings. For
example a twelve-day visit to the US in 1959, a UN General Assembly, also in
1959 and a later UN General Assembly meeting in 1960 in the US. (13) Although
then relations began to break down again due to the building of the Berlin
Wall in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Eastern bloc became
cut off once more, western ideas had already managed to penetrate the East.
(14) The information that the capitalist West was thriving while the Communist
Eastern bloc was stagnating and underdeveloped, made communism and Soviet
control even more unpopular.
In 1963 there again was an easing of tensions between the two blocs when
Russia and the US signed a test ban treaty which allowed the West's
influence to again creep into the East. (15) In 1964 Khrushchev was ousted
from power and Brezhnev with Kosygin took over from him. (16) In 1966 the US
and USSR agreed to a direct air service between Moscow and New York. In 1967
they, along with 60 other countries, signed the first international treaty
providing for the peaceful exploration of outer space. (17) In the 1970's a
period of D�tente began. In 1970 West Germany and Poland signed a treaty
rejecting the use of force. West Germany and Russia ratified a similar treaty
in 1972. (18) In 1972 Nixon and Brezhnev signed the SALT I treaty which was to
limit the production of US and Russian nuclear weapons. In 1973 East and West
Germany joined the UN. (19) Throughout this period the West had more and more
access to the Eastern bloc and the people of the communist countries were
influenced by these ideas. This was a further blow to communist rule and
another factor in the downfall of communism.
The next contributing factor to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
was that of its economic failure. During the years of war communism from
1918-1921, Soviet labourers worked for pittance wages. At the same time the
Bolshevik confiscated virtually all harvests. This brought the country to the
brink of economic collapse. The net result of war communism under Lenin was
that from 1914 the countryside was neglected and destroyed and in 1920 there
was a severe drought. (20) In 1921 the New Economic Policy (NEP) was
introduced. This was in effect a limited capitalism. Peasants were allowed to
keep their surpluses after taxes were paid. Bonuses, extra rations and better
housing were offered as incentives. Still there was widespread opposition to
the communist policy with the beginnings of a "peasant war" against Stalin's'
proposed collectivisation policy in 1928. (21) Although agricultural
production increased, the standard of living was lowered and hardship was
widespread. Forcible collectivisation was pursued until 1935. This again shows
the people's general opposition to communist policies. Collectivisation
failed to meet agricultural requirements during WWII. The human cost of the
policy was staggering. If the people are suffering under a particular regime
they will not support it, how then can this regime hope to survive?
When Khrushchev came to power, he too failed to salvage the economy.
Although some of the policies which he introduced in the 1950's had an
initial success, they soon collapsed with disastrous effects. Figures for meat
in 1958 were artificially high but collapsed soon after. In 1962 there were
sharp increases in the prices of butter and meat. (22) Food riots were
forcibly quelled by the shooting of seventy unarmed demonstrators in 1962.
(23) Industry was not faring any better and by 1963 production levels had
declined sharply in every branch of industry. As Khrushchev himself said of
communism in 1958:- "If, after forty years of communism, a person cannot
have a glass of milk and a pair of shoes, he will not believe that communism
is a good thing" (24)
Under Brezhnev the economic state of the USSR continued to decline. Support
for communism was falling and due to improved relations with the West, the
people could see how disadvantaged they were. Under Andropov who succeeded
Brezhnev in 1982 the situation did not improve. Change began only when
Gorbachev came to power in 1985. (25) The major problems in the economy which
Gorbachev had to deal with were, the wasteful use of resources, the lack of
innovation, a poor division of labour, too many costly products being
produced, ineffective use of resources and low productivity. There was a
resistance to technological innovation due to a lack of incentives. Wages were
low and the mechanisms involved in introducing a new idea or practice were
time-consuming and complicated. There was a general inflexibility in the
enterprise network which also stifled innovation. There was also a lack of
investment in new ideas and industry. Gorbachev's solution to these problems
was a "Perestroika" of the economy.
The challenge of Perestroika was to move to more intensive methods of
production and more effective use of inputs. His economic polices began with
the promise of a revival of some of the practices of NEP. His aim was to cause
output to double by the year 2000 and for production and productivity to rise
substantially. It was not until 1987, however, that these ideas were put into
a concrete plan. (26) A vigorous anti-alcohol campaign was initiated.
Vineyards were destroyed and beer production was cut-back. By 1988, however,
they had to admit that this policy was a complete failure and it was abandoned
in 1990. (27) By 1985 the USSR had a budget deficit of R37 billion. (28) Due
to miscalculations in relation to the extent of the budget deficit, Gorbachev
authorised spending in social and investment sectors while maintaining the
spending in the military sector. This was a gross mistake which resulted in
the budget deficit in 1989 having increased to R100 billion or 11% of the
Gross National Product (GNP) and was predicted to rise to R120 billion.
Therefore, under Gorbachev, the budget deficit rose from 3% in 1985 to 14% in
1989. (29) Inflation increased to over 5%. (30) Prices failed to reflect the
high cost of production and many companies were working at a loss. This
economic failure of communism meant that support for the system fell and that
it was becoming increasingly more difficult for the communist party to
convince the people that this indeed was the way forward, and a better
solution than capitalism.
Gorbachev therefore aimed to tie salaries into achieved results and to
remove subsidies on some goods and services. He did not act immediately,
however, with his price reform package as he hoped to first achieve a balance
between supply and demand. This merely worsened matters and wages continued to
rise faster than output and productivity. The main failure of Perestroika is
that it didn't remove the old price system. Instead, it allowed the old
price system, which was based on scarcity, to continue, and this merely
exacerbated shortages. Ironically, it was the mass organisations of people,
who had emerged to defend living standards, who actually hampered the struggle
against inflation and the budget deficit. This situation was partly created by
the fact that the governing party had no popular support and hadn't been
popularly elected. The economic situation continued to decline. There was a
zero growth rate. Shops were calculated to be lacking 243 out 276 basic
consumer items and there was a chronic shortage of 1000 items out of 1200
which would be on a model shopping list. There was a static farm output and
high levels of inflation. (31) Therefore it can be seen that communism was an
economic disaster. Khrushchev's remark again can be used to illustrate the
effect which this had on the support for communism. (see ref 24).
As previously mentioned, communism never had majority support or a
legitimate political basis. Force and coercion were regularly used to ensure
that the communist party remained in power. Therefore one can maintain that
the fact that communism was a political failure was also a contributing factor
to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. If a party has not got the
support of a majority, then it has a weak political basis. The fact that
undemocratic means were used to ensure that the communists came to, and then
maintained, power shows that communism was a political failure. Throughout the
history of communism in Russia, never once did the party gain a majority
support or truly succeed in suppressing public demonstrations of antipathy
towards communism. It can therefore be argued that a political leadership with
no political basis or support could ever hope to survive.
Another important factor to note is communism's utter failure in relation
to society and culture. Soviet society under Communist rule was socially and
culturally underdeveloped. The state had a say in every aspect of societal
life. In response to low birth rates, large numbers of orphans and the failure
of 37/100 marriages in 1934 alone, the communist leadership compelled the
media to promote stable family life. (32) Propaganda was used to coerce the
people into believing in the positive virtues of marriage and children.
Divorce was made more difficult and abortion was prohibited. Thus the people's
right to choose and exert control over their own personal and familial
decisions was removed. In schools, the teaching of the social sciences was
curtailed and Marxist and Leninist theories were expounded. In the late
thirties fees were reintroduced for the three upper forms of secondary school.
This effectively meant that only those who could afford to pay these fees
could send their children on to further academic training as these were the
forms which prepared children for higher education. (33) Under Stalin
topographical, economic and political information and affairs were a state
secret. Maps were inaccurate and details about past disasters and history were
omitted or embellished.
Propaganda and brainwashing was used to ensure that the virtues of
communism were extolled and a cult following was created around Lenin and
Stalin. "A Short Course on the History of the CPSU" became the staple
intellectual diet of all schoolchildren. (34) This was a propagandistic book
based on an idealistic view of communism and its leaders. The mass arrests,
the truth of the purges and the labour camps were not allowed to be discussed
in the media. State monopoly of information and mass communications deployed
in this way, and backed by the use of coercion and force and the military,
degraded the nation's intellectual and cultural life. People were simply not
allowed to form an opinion contrary to that of the communist state. People
were also not allowed to choose their own religion or follow their own
personal religious beliefs. The state outlawed and censored religious "propaganda"
and publications. The Soviet state actively and brutally persecuted the
churches. A large number of these were desecrated or destroyed. More than half
of all monasteries were forced to close and in 1921 twenty-eight bishops were
arrested or died in violent clashes with the Soviet military. (35) Attempts
were also made to split the church from the inside. By 1939 only 12 bishops,
out of the 163 who had been active in 1930, remained. (36) These repressive
measures, as a whole, meant that the growth of Soviet culture and society was
stunted and stagnating. The secrecy and lies undermined efficiency, isolated
individuals and eroded the morale of society. This was compounded by the fact
that, due to Western influences, the public in the communist countries were
beginning to realise their predicament and their backwardness. These measures
continued until Gorbachev came to power.
This point leads onto the most important factor which contributed to the
eventual collapse of communism in the East, that is, Gorbachev. Without
Gorbachev it is doubtful that the disintegration of the communist regime would
have occurred so soon. Gorbachev can be seen as a reform communist. He
introduced a number of revolutionary reforms like Perestroika and Glasnost.
The combined effect of these policies, and his general attitude to reform,
communism and the USSR, had the effect of causing the culmination of all
opposition to communism and collapsing the system.
Glasnost proved to be a great relief valve which allowed the people to
voice their long-standing discontent about communism and the communist regime
as a whole. The positive elements of Glasnost had the effect of bringing
national tensions to the surface of political and social life and, in a sense,
exacerbating the national problem. Liberalisation made people less afraid of
retribution when they spoke out against the injustices of the system and the
atrocities which had occurred. The ripple effect of Gorbachev's radical
Perestroika and Glasnost weakened the authority of the communist governments -
economically, socially and ideologically. Above all the failure of communism
lay in the failure of Gorbachev's Perestroika. If the economy had improved
then so too would the people's well-being and they may have considered
maintaining the communist regime.
The fundamental problem with Perestroika was how to change a system which
had been built to withstand change. It was increasingly fractured. It had
originally been based on inaccurate figures about the well-being of the
economy and the national debt. Life under Perestroika became even harder for
the majority of Soviet people. There were no state-employed social groups or
skilled workers who stood to gain from Perestroika in the short term. Economic
reform involved hard work and higher prices and therefore Perestroika was
short on support. As the economic situation worsened, so too did the people's
support for communism fall. This time there was a difference however. Due to
Glasnost the people and the media were now free to criticise the policy.
Glasnost had the effect of ensuring that the previous reign of terror which
the communist leadership had held, was brought to an end. Gorbachev employed a
policy of "Glasnost", that is, openness and the right to criticise and
express an opinion. Up until then Soviet society was closed. No criticism or
freedom of speech was allowed. The major feature of Glasnost is that of the
lifting of most of the restrictions which had been imposed on the circulation
of information since communism began. The blank pages in history were about to
be filled in. Gorbachev realised that the former policy of absolute secrecy
was a major force holding back the development of society. Censorship was
relaxed. This had the adverse effect of allowing the public criticism of a
regime which previously could not be criticised.
Gorbachev also allowed increasing independence to the Eastern bloc states.
He had come to the conclusion that compelling an unwilling population to live
under a system they detested was not ensuring the USSR's security, but on
the contrary, jeopardising it. He indicated by omission, rather than by direct
statement, that he would not obstruct a change which would result in these
states achieving a measure of independence.
In Czechoslovakia on the 18th of January 1989 there was a decision taken to
legalise Solidarity. (37) On the 10th of February the Hungarian communists
agreed to a multi-party system and there was no opposition to this on the part
of the Soviets. On 29th March Moscow told the Hungarians that they would not
interfere in East European affairs. (38) In Poland on January 18th, Solidarity
had been legalised after a string of protests and riots in Hungary. (39) This
led to an agreement between the communist government and Solidarity, the main
focus of which was the holding of the first relatively free elections since
the 1940's in Poland. The elections were devastating to the communists. They
were swept out of the Senate and did not have any representatives elected to
the Sejm until the second round of counting. (40)
This had a domino effect and hastened events elsewhere. Far from Gorbachev's
original hope that allowing the Eastern states more freedom would bring the
union closer together, it was tearing the union apart. Kadar was ousted from
Hungary and the communists were swept aside by the Hungarian Democratic Forum.
On September 11th Hungary opened its borders with Austria and allowed
thousands of East Germans to cross to the west. (41) The people of East
Germany were demanding Glasnost and Perestroika. On October 9th a mass
demonstration of 70,000 people occurred in Leipzig. (42) Thousands of Germans
were escaping to the west through Hungary and the GDR was powerless to stop
them. Honecker, the East German leader, buckled under the pressure and
resigned. The net effect of which was that his successors allowed the opening
of the Berlin Wall on 8th November 1989 after the East German government and
communist leadership resigned. (43)
On the 24th of November the Czechoslovak Communist Party resigned after
mass demonstrations in Prague of up to 800,000 people. On the 7th of December
the communist government in Czechoslovakia collapsed entirely and a new
non-communist government was formed. (44)
Gorbachevs's reforms were wreaking havoc on the communist system. Its
base, already weak and fragile, began to crumble away under the massive wave
of anti-communist feeling which had finally come to the fore after years of
suppression. On the 11th of December Bulgarian communists were forced to agree
to a multi-party system and on the 25th, the Rumanian leader Ceausescu and his
wife were tried and executed. (45) All of this was borne out of Gorbachev's
reforms. The communist regime had been built on force and coercion, terror and
undemocratic methods. This regime could therefore not be expected to survive
under such an onslaught. In refusing the Eastern bloc communist parties aid to
suppress the revolts within, Gorbachev effectively sealed their fate. The
communist parties in those countries had always relied on Soviet force for
support in maintaining control of the countries, now that his support had been
removed the regimes crumbled. Therefore the significance of the Gorbachev
factor cannot be denied when discussing the downfall of communism in Eastern
Europe. If Gorbachev had not introduced his reforms or had not refused aid to
the other Eastern bloc communist parties, the communist regime may have still
stood today. Gorbachev may not have been the cause of the downfall, but he was
certainly the trigger. The situation was like a fuse, Gorbachev merely
provided the matches and refused to stop the fire.
The final factor which this essay will examine, is that of the loss of
elite party confidence. With his reforms Gorbachev had undermined the morale
and confidence of the party elite. It had become clear that the communist
cause had exhausted itself and was a failure. Their utopian hopes had been
torn apart one by one throughout the years and Gorbachev had made them face
this fact. This had a paralysing effect on them and led to their apathy about
the ending of communism. If they had believed that there was something left to
fight for they may have used physical force to overthrow Gorbachev and
suppress the revolts, but they did not. Gorbachev had launched a step-by-step
dismantling of the party and the nomenklatura under Perestroika. He separated
and neutralised his most militant opponents among the conservative members of
the party elite. At the 28th Congress the party elite was divided between
those who would monitor the development of Glasnost and perestroika, and the
Presidency who would champion the fight against the unreformable members of
the nomenklatura. (46) Until the 28th Congress membership of the nomenklatura
had been a ticket to wealth and power, after the conference it became a mere
shell. Membership fell off and loyalties faded. A form of local government
control was implemented by Gorbachev to further diminish the role of the
Politburo. Piece by piece Gorbachev was chipping away at the old elite's
confidence and beliefs. The fact that Gorbachev was gaining support both from
the public at home and abroad, further eroded their confidence.
When the USSR began to collapse, however, certain voices in the party
refused to allow Gorbachev dismantle more of their dreams. Yelstin was
emerging at this time as an opponent to Gorbachev's rule. In response
Gorbachev banned a pro-Yelstin rally in Moscow in 1991. (47) Alarmed at a
series of political strikes and a growing support for Yelstin, Gorbachev
negotiated a compromise which stipulated that in return for an end to
political strikes, Gorbachev would negotiate a new Union treaty which would
give power to the republics. The day before this treaty was to be signed,
however, its opponents moved to forestall it. Pugo announced that he was
assuming presidential control as Gorbachev was ill and declared a state of
emergency. (48) Gorbachev refused to concur with this announcement. Yelstin
called for a general strike and said that the emergency government was "unconstitutional".
(49) Some workers went on strike, more did not. Battle lines were being drawn
and the complete collapse of communism was not far behind. The leaders of the
coup were arrested by Gorbachev's men and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.
The failed coup ironically however, had precipitated the process it had
been trying to prevent, that is, the break up of the USSR and the demise of
the communist party. In the Russian parliament Yelstin signed a decree
suspending the communist party pending an investigation of the coup. Gorbachev
had triumphed over the plotters but now had to capitulate to Yelstin. After a
vain attempt at protest, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU
and recommended that the General Committee should disband itself. In June 1991
Yelstin was elected president of Russia. (50) After the failure of the coup
most of the Soviet republics declared their independence and sovereignty.
Gorbachev tried unsuccessfully to revive the Union treaty for several months
afterwards, but to no avail. The chain of events had been set in motion and
could not be stopped now.
On the 8th of December 1991 Yelstin, along with the Beloruissian and
Ukraine leaders issued a statement which declared the end of the USSR. They
offered a "Commonwealth of Independent States" in return and invited other
countries to join. (51) Gorbachev protested at first but then bowed to the
inevitable. Communism in Eastern Europe had collapsed. On the 25th of December
1991, he tendered his resignation as president of the USSR and the communist
flag was lowered from the Kremlin dome to be replaced by the Russian tricolour.
(52)
Communism in Eastern Europe, therefore, collapsed for a number of reasons.
It had no political basis or popular support. It was riddled with economic
problems and, in comparison to capitalism, was a complete failure. Finally the
Gorbachev factor and the loss of elitist party confidence fanned the flames
and destroyed communism. Communism broke down because of fatal weaknesses
built into the system from its inception. It is in a human's nature to aim
for success and prosperity. Communism denies the competitive trait which is
inherent in all humans. Communism was rejected because it is not as good as
alternative systems of satisfying humans material wants. Communism also is at
odds with the other most basic instinct which a human has, that is, the desire
for freedom. Communism, in practice, denied the expression of civil liberties,
opinions and thought. It was also a forced rule which was only enforced by
terror, not acceptance or majority ruling. Such a regime could only hope to
last for a certain period, never indefinitely. Gorbachev's reforms were
merely the catalyst for this failure. Gorbachev wished to reform the system,
not destroy it, but the situation rapidly went out of control as years of
pent-up frustration and antipathy toward the communist regime was finally
given expression.
Can we therefore validate the quotation by Rogers which was made at the
start of this essay? This essay would argue yes. A regime which is inherently
against human nature can never hope to succeed. It is human to want what we
cannot have and to be denied it, as with prohibition, makes us all the more
determined and curious to achieve that which is forbidden. The same can be
said to be true for communism. Therefore this essay would conclude that
although there were a number of external contributory influence to the
collapse of communism, communism as an ideal cannot hope to survive for long
in anything more than a theoretical sense, as it is inherently contrary to the
basic drives of human nature.
FOOTNOTES
(1) Various Inputs, Chronicle of the 20th Century Quotations (Guinness
Publishing Ltd., 1996) page 36
(2) Various Inputs, World Book Encyclopaedias (World Book Inc., 1984) page
727
(3) Kehoe, A.M, Makers of 20th Century Europe (Mentor Publications Ltd.,
1988) page 25
(4) Ibid., page 32
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., page 33
(7) Ibid., page 40
(8) O' Brien, Eileen, Modern Europe 1870-1966 (Mentor Publications Ltd.,
1995) page 231
(9) Kehoe, A.M, op cit., page 50
(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid., page 52
(14) Ibid.
(15) Various Inputs, op cit. (1984) page 618b
(16) Ibid., page 618a
(17) Ibid., page 618b
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Kehoe, A.M, op cit. page 13
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid., page 55
(23) Ibid.
(24) Various Inputs, op cit. (1996) page 142
(25) Sakwa, Richard, Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (Philip Allan,
1990) page 271
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid., page 272
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) Ibid., page 281
(32) Hosking, Geoffrey, A History of the Soviet Union (Fontana Press, 1992)
page 213
(33) Ibid., page 215
(34) Ibid., page 218
(35) Ibid., page 228
(36) Ibid., page 235
(37) Ibid., page 245
(38) Ibid.
(39) Ibid.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid., page 466
(42) Ibid.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid., page 468
(46) Novikov, Euvgeny & Bascio, Patrick, Gorbachev and the Collapse of
the Soviet Communist Party (Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994) page 68
(47) Hosking, Geoffrey, op cit. page 494
(48) Ibid., page 495
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid., page 497
(51) Ibid., page 498
(52) Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brown, Archie, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford University Press, 1996)
Hosking, Geoffrey, A History of the Soviet Union (Fontana Press, 1992)
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