On the 23 March 1919 after a series of Communist 
demonstrations, the almost forgotten Mussolini decided to attempt to
revive his Fasci movement. A meeting was held in a hall in a Milan and 
was attended by some fifty malcontents. From this seemingly small and 
insignificant event the Fascio di Combattimento' (Combat Group) was 
born. Initially, it would seem that the Fasci were destined for 
failure with none of their candidates (including Mussolini) winning a 
single seat in the 1919 elections. How was it that a party with no 
clear programme, save a belief in action of some sort, became a ruling 
dictatorship little more than ten years later? By the end of 1919, 
Mussolini possessed hardly more than 2% of the vote in Milan, less 
than 5000 votes against 170,000 for the Socialists. Was this a 
complete disaster? At the time it seemed so; the Socialists were so 
confident of their success that they staged a mock funeral in Milan 
stopping outside Mussolini's house to invite him to attend the burial 
of his party. Incredibly, by 1921 the membership of this previously 
tiny group was to rival the size of the Socialists. How was this
achieved? It was certainly by no easy means; Mussolini's skill and 
luck played a vital role, but he was also helped by the seemingly 
blind incompetence of his opponents. Mussolini's path towards the top 
of Italian Government was hindered by many forms of opposition. 
However, most of his opposition came from the Government and the rival 
Socialist (PSI) party. Soon after the summer of 1920 the Fascists and 
their opposition inevitably clashed. The fact that Gioletti's 
government was faced with « million workers sitting in in factories 
showed that Italy was a far from stable country in 1920. Did an 
opportunity present itself for Mussolini to gain ground over the 
Socialist opposition? If it did, Mussolini certainly did not take it. 
He was still recovering from his party's humiliating election defeat. 
Eventually the union leaders, evidently surprised by this sudden, 
spontaneous revolutionary outburst persuaded the workers to give in in 
return for higher wages. Although initially it would seem that the
workers had won, the strikes had sown the seeds of fear amongst 
Italy's Socialist opposition. The overall effect of this was that
many of the opponents of Socialism joined Mussolini's Fascist' party. 
The Socialist party by causing the strike had unwittingly played into 
Mussolini's hands; although this was due to their own incompetence and 
not the skill of Mussolini. Interestingly, they were later to make 
exactly the same mistake again. The fact that Mussolini's party 
benefitted greatly by offering action, showed that political gains 
could be made from the weakness of the government and from the unrest 
of the country. It was at this point in 1921 that Gioletti began 
searching for allies against the Socialists. The Vatican had turned 
against him; This was mainly due to the government's proposal to tax 
the bonds which were a main form of Church property at the time. As a 
result Gioletti decided to use Fascist support against the Socialists. 
Why did Gioletti decide to use the Fascist's support to combat the
Socialists, when there were many other safer ways of doing so? 
Principally, he believed that he could easily dominate Mussolini
and once in power again he would discard the tougher elements' among 
the Fascists. He made a grave mistake in believing this. In the winter 
of 1920-21, Mussolini organized his men into squadre d'azione' (squads 
of action) headed by local leaders ( ras') like Balbo in Ferrara and 
Grandi in Bologna. Primarily, Mussolini's clever planning was 
demonstrated by his success: His initial campaign of violence against 
the Socialists led to 200 dead and 800 wounded in the period between 
December 1920 and May 1921. The government, in accordance with its 
alliance with the Fascists, did little to prevent the violence, and 
instead saw it as a cheap way of curbing the rise of socialism. Even 
when in the spring of 1921 the clashes had reached riot proportions, 
the government nonetheless decided that they had succeeded in their 
aim of disrupting the progress of socialism. Later at the Socialist 
party congress in January 1921 the PSI split into a revolutionary and 
a reformist wing. This move was welcomed, if not actually forced by 
the Fascists. With Socialist support diminishing rapidly, the Fascists 
gained a vital foothold in Parliament. Primarily, this was achieved 
through the election of 15 May 1921. Because his party offered action, 
Mussolini gained from the weakness of the government and from the 
unrest in the country. During the election the government used Fascist 
support to unseat Socialist and Catholic deputies; this was mainly 
done by beating up opponents. Mussolini met little opposition to his
actions; the police and prefects remained neutral or actively aided 
the Fascists with transport and arms. The Fascists performed
particularly well in the elections as the figures below show: 

---
Extreme Nationalists 10
Fascists 35 Government bloc (184)
National Bloc (Gioletti) 139
Radicals (Liberal Democrats) 68 Potential centrist
Popolari' 107 opposition (175)
Reformists 29
Socialists 123 Left opposition (176)
Communists 15 Total seats (535)
National minorities 9
---

        The Fascists were invited by Prime Minister Gioletti to form a 
part of his right-wing electoral alliance, thereby promising them,
for the first time, some influence in the government as well as in the 
streets. Gioletti had given the Fascists a chance to become an 
accepted political force.

        Primarily, Prime Minister Gioletti must be held responsible as 
one of the main reasons for Mussolini gaining another chance to fight 
for power. As Mussolini's Fascist Party grew, so seemingly did the 
incompetence of Gioletti. He became increasingly dependent upon the 
Fascists to take direct and often brutal action against the unions and 
peasant leagues. His unorthodox methods were careless, unparliamentary 
and were to be extremely self-destructive. It seemed that Gioletti and 
his government had lost the will to govern the country and its people. 
>From May to July 1921 Gioletti was to govern on the basis of this
coalition. However, within a year there were to be thirteen different 
groups in Parliament. Since the parliament fell into three 
approximately equal groupings, the Fascist's thirty-five seats were 
crucial to the stability of the government. If the Fascists defected 
to the opposition, government would have been very difficult. The 
knowledge that the Fascists had become a powerful force in government 
took Mussolini by surprise. His immediate reaction to this situation 
was to become a respectable participant in government. In doing this, 
he signed a peace treaty', and a pact of pacification' with the 
Socialists to end their mutual violence. However, his lieutenants in 
the provinces disliked and disagreed with his curb on their power. In 
actual fact Mussolini resigned as leader for a brief period of time; 
however in November he accepted their demands for continued hostility
and tore up the pact. The economic conditions of the 1920's did much 
to encourage support for extremist parties; both the Fascists and the 
Socialists benefitted greatly. This was mainly due to Italy's war 
debts and problems of reconstruction, as well as the devaluation of 
the lire. The working-class voter's wage remained at pre-war levels 
while prices increased everywhere. This resulted in increasing support 
for the left-wing parties who, the working-class voters hoped, would 
press for wage claims. In some cases, they took action on their own 
behalf by striking or occupying factories. It was to be Mussolini's 
skill that was to gain him support from these actions. The strikes had 
raised the spectre of revolution, and this in turn, increased the 
attraction of the Fascists to the middle-class population and those 
who feared socialism. It was Mussolini's policies of firm action to 
prevent revolution that many Italians saw as the only alternative to 
Bolshevism. The period from December 1921 to November 1922 was to see 
the overall demise of the Socialist and government opposition to 
Mussolini. During this period, Fascist thuggery became ever more 
efficient, claiming 3000 lives of the Socialist supporters, with only 
300 Fascist fatalities. Finally, on 26 June 1921 Gioletti's 
incompetence caught up with him; he was forced to resign due to 
Fascist opposition in Parliament. A combination of Mussolini's 
opportunism and skill, and Gioletti's inadequacy to govern Italy had 
resulted in Gioletti's resignation. His successor was to be Ivanoe 
Bonomi, who was a reformist Socialist, and formed a government with 
Radical and Popolari' support. His choice of parties was rather 
dangerous to his political position as one was clerical and the other 
anti-clerical. He did not last long, and within four weeks the King 
had asked Luigi Facta to head the new Italian government. A famous
historian, Denis Mack Smith, has described him as follows ... a timid, 
ignorant provincial lawyer who had risen in politics by seniority 
alone. His appointment was at first taken almost as a joke...'. 
Deserted by the Popolari' in the summer of 1922, he lost his 
Prime-ministerial position; however, he soon became Prime Minister 
again on 1 August when no other could be found. Fortunately for 
Mussolini, Facta did not provide any form of powerful opposition 
towards him or his party's actions. The very day that Facta formed his 
new ministry in government, the unions began a general strike. The 
strike was called in an effort to force the government to halt the 
Fascist violence; in particular it was a protest against Balbo's 
actions in Romagna. Unfortunately for the Socialists, they played into 
Mussolini's hands, for yet again the problem of a socialist revolution 
was raised. Mussolini cleverly showed the public that he was the man 
to restore order while in the background he made use of his disorderly 
supporters. The strike collapsed after one day, and Mussolini and his 
Fascists gained increasing support. The once strong socialist 
opposition had disintegrated into a weak, disorganized group of 
individuals; Mussolini had succeeded in removing an important part of 
the opposition. There were still a number of potential obstacles to 
Mussolini. The most obvious were the King and the army (who were 
controlled by the government). By October 1922 the government had 
virtually broken down, and much of Italy was in political disarray. 
Facta suggested that the entire cabinet should resign, but when his 
idea was turned down, he started to plan a coalition with the 
Fascists. It is interesting to note that the troops were still loyal 
to the King; there can be little doubt that a firm government could 
have crushed any armed attempt against the regime. Mussolini was well
aware of this, and concentrated his efforts on political manoeuvre. He 
demonstrated his perceptiveness of the political situation when he 
realised that the Facta government was helpless and thinking in terms 
of a coalition. Taking advantage of the situation, Mussolini met with 
the leaders of the various Fascist groups. Action was planned for 28 
October on lines that had been worked out earlier. Three concentration 
points were selected which the groups were to reach by any means of 
transport and so avoid the chance of an early clash with the army. 
Such a clash was to be avoided at all costs and army units were to be 
treated with courtesy and friendliness. Again this was clever 
decision-making by Mussolini, who realised the potential threat 
presente by the army. After a series of parades and speech-making to 
gather support, Mussolini presented his demands to the government. In 
essence they were simple; there was to be a new cabinet with at least 
six Fascist ministers in important posts. On the 25 October Mussolini 
left for Milan while the Party Congress continued to distract the 
government's attention. In reply to Mussolini's demands, the Facta 
cabinet responded surprisingly slowly; they were convinced that they 
had plenty of time in hand. Eventually, they decided that the answer 
would be in the form of a new coalition which would include a number 
of Fascists. However, confusion and disorganisation reigned as members 
of the cabinet continued to scheme. With this in mind, Facta decided 
to resign, though his cabinet still ran the government until a new 
leader could be chosen. It is difficult to find sound reasoning behind 
Facta's resignation; his resignation can be described as little more 
than a blunder. It did nothing but highlight the weakness of the 
cabinet and the instability of the government. Initially, it seemed to 
succeed; in view of his resignation, the Fascist leaders hesitated as 
to whether or not their plans should go ahead for 28 October. However,
unfortunately for the government, the Fascist party machine could not 
be halted and local units began to requisition trains and borrow arms 
from friendly military units. Eventually, Facta was persuaded to 
return and to declare a state of siege in Rome. Facta, now becoming 
increasingly worried about the fascist threat, was reluctant to take 
such action. Instead, he went to the King to ask for a proclamation 
declaring a state of emergency. This would have enabled the army to 
have been called out against the Fascist columns. However, the King 
rightly feared civil war, and doubted Facta's ability to control the 
situation. He was approached twice, but both times he refused to sign 
a proclamation. Facta's reputation had been damaged so much, that
even the King had little trust left for him. Mussolini having realised 
that there would be an armed clash, increased his demands. Again, this 
turned out to be a well considered and successful plan. On 29 October 
Rachele Mussolini received a telephone message from Rome, requesting 
the presence of Mussolini at the palace. At noon, Mussolini received a 
telegram; Mussolini was to form a government. It was not long before 
Mussolini had formed a moderate cabinet containing only four Fascist
ministers. He was secure in the knowledge that he had the nations 
support for a government which was prepared to act. In addition, he 
knew that he had virtually no opposition, and had the support of the 
King, the army, and the industrialists as well as the loyalty of his 
Fascist followers. In conclusion, then, to what extent can we 
attribute Mussolini's seizure of power to his own skill or the 
incompetence of his opponents? In view of his own skill, Mussolini's 
career has been presented as one of blunder and bluff'. However, the 
1920's was a period in which bluff' was more suited to success. It is 
also true to say that undoubtedly Mussolini helped the Fascist party 
into power through his own skill. Although initially, the Fascist 
party had widespread but unorganised support, Mussolini brought a 
certain national structure and identity to the party. His first 
contribution was the organisation of the party, making it a movement 
as well as a party, and therefore making it a viable choice in an 
election. Secondly, Mussolini brought home the importance of 
opportunism and action as opposed to inactivity and fixed ideologies. 
As S. Lee argues, Mussolini was strongly inclined to intuitive 
behaviour and projected himself as a flexible pragmatist. This allowed
him to make full use of the chaotic conditions in Italy, and 
considerably increased the Fascist party's fortunes. However, we
must also consider that to a certain extent, the opposition's 
continued failures and misjudgments almost pushed Mussolini into
power. We must also take account of the fact that Mussolini certainly 
had his fair share of luck - a prime example is the King's refusal to 
declare a state of emergency, which would have allowed the army to 
attack the Fascists. However, it was his ability to act out the role 
of the Italian people's dream leader that gave him the most success. 
He played upon the post-war crisis, and made it appear that Fascism 
was the only way in which socialism would be smashed, and Italy's 
society and status would be rebuilt. To the Italian people, Mussolini 
was the great leader they had been desperately searching for - the 
leader who was going to make Italy a great power, and a respected 
force in the world.