Vietnam was a country that was far removed from the American people
until their history and ours became forever interlinked in what has come
to be known as the Vietnam conflict. It is a classic story of good guys
versus bad, communism versus freedom, and a constant struggle for stability.
Americas attempt to aid the cause of freedom was a valid one, but one that
ended up with South Vietnam being dependent upon us for its very life as
a nation. "Vietnamization" was the name for the plan to allow South Vietnam
to stand on its own, and ended in leaving a country totally on its own,
unable to stand and fight. Vietnam was a French territory until the Viet
Minh insurgency of the late 1940's and through 1954. Although regarding
this uprising as part of a larger Communist conspiracy, Americans were
not unsympathetic to Vietnamese aspirations for national independence.
The ensueing defeat of the French brought an end to the first stage of
what was to be a thirty year struggle. The Indochina ceasefire agreement
(Geneva Accords) of July 21, 1954 led to the creation of seperate states
in Laos and Cambodia, and the artificial division of Vietnam into two republics.
In the North the Communist Viet Minh established the democratic of Vietnam,
and in the south a random collection of non - Communist factions, led by
Ngo Dinh Diem, formed the Republic of Vietnam. The general elections provided
for by the agreement never took place, and the two states quickly drew
apart. The United States immediatly threw its support behind the southern
regime and extended military aid through a Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG) under the command of Lt. General John W. O'Daniel. American
objectives in South Vietnam were reletively simple and remained so -- the
establishment and preservation of a non - Communist government in South
Vietnam. Initally, the most pressing problem was the weakness of the Saigon
government and the danger of cival war between South Vietnam's armed religious
and political factions. Diem, however, acting as a kind of benevolent dictator,
managed to put a working government together, and O'Daniel's advisory group,
about three or four hundred people, went to work creating a national army.
Slowly, under the direction of O'Daniel and his successor in October 1955,
Lt. General Samuel T. Williams, the new army took shape. The primary mission
of this 150,000 man force was to repel a North Vietnamese invasion across
the Demilitarised zone that seperated North and South Vietnam. Diem and
his American advisors thus organised and trained the new army for a Korean
- style conflict, rather than for the unconventional guerrilla warfare
that had characterised the earlier French - Viet Minh struggle.
President Minh also maintained a substantial paramilitary force almost
as large as the regular army. This force's primary task was to maintain
internal security, but also acted as a counter weight to the army, whose
officers often had political ambitions that were sometimes incompatible
with those of Diem. From the beginning, such tensions weakened the Saigon
government and severly hampered its ability to deal with South Vietnam's
social and ecenomic problems. At the beginning of 1968 the military strength
of the Saigon government was, on paper, impressive. The regular armed forces
consisted of about 250,000 men, organised into a conventional army, navy,
air force, and marine corps, well equipped with tanks, artillary, ships
and aircraft, Behind the regulars was a similar - size militia - like organization,
the Territorial forces. Although consisting mainly of small rifle units,
the territorials had begun to recieve modern radios, vehicles, and small
arms during the early 1960's, and their capabilities had increased considerably.
The organization of the armed forces mirrored most Western nations; a civialian
Ministry of Defence directed a military general staff which headed a heirarchy
of operational commands and various support and training facilities. The
Territorial Forces, a formal part of the armed forcse since 1964, was apportioned
amon the forty - four province cheifs, the principle administrators of
Vietnam. In comparison, the Viet Cong army looked pertty weak. With some
80,000 lightly equipped regulars, back by about 80,000 - 100,000 part -
time geuirillas and supported by a few thousand North Vietnamese troops
and a fragile supply line hundreds of miles long, it was hardly an imposing
force. Nevertheless, this force had inflicted a series of defeats on the
South Vietnamese troops, all but throwing then out of the copuntryside
and back into the cities and towns.
Vietnamization
In the spring of 1969 Presiden Richard M. Nixon initiated his new policy
of "Vietnamization." Vietnamization had two distinct elements: first, the
unilateral withdraawl of American troops from South Vietnam; and, second,
the assumptionof greater military responsibilities by the South Vietnamese
armed forces to make up for that loss. Mlilitary planners had based previous
withdrawl plans on reductions in enemy forces. Vietnaminization rested
on the twin assumptions thqat the combatants would not reach any kind of
political settlement, or understanding, and that the fightinh in the South
would continue without any voluntary reduction in enemy force levels. Although
in theory the subsequant withdrawl of American troops depended on improvements
in Souh Vietnamese military capabilities and the level of combat activity,
in practice the timing and size of the withdrawals were highly political
decisions made in the United States. Senior advisors in Vietnam were asked
for their opinions on South Vietnam's ability to handle a Viet Cong threat,
or a combined Viet Cong - North Vietnamese threat, and their answers were
for the most part the same. They agreed that South Vietnam would be able
to "contain" a Viet Cong threat except in the III Corps Tactical zone,
wherecontinued American air and artillerary support would be needed. Against
a combined threat, however, all doubted that the South Vietnamese could
do little more than hold their own, and judged their offensive capabilities
marginal at best. Although they made no recomendations as to how the South
Vietnamese could deal with either a Viet Cong or a combined threat, and
suggested no changes in their military organization or stratedgy, all saw
a pressing need for more air, artillery, and logistical support, and more
attention to training and retaining troops. Most recommended more promotions
based on merit, and more stationing of troops near home to reduce desertions.
Phasing the American troops out of Vietnam could take no less than five
years was often mentioned. The four senior advisors were hopeful that the
South Vietnamese could eventually deal with the insurgency by themselves,
but none felt that they could handle a conventional North Vietnamese threat
or a combined Viet Cong - North Vietnam opponent.
On March 5, 1969, Melvin R. Laird, Nixon's new secretary of defence,
visited Saigon, accompanied by General Wheeler. Briefed by the MACV (United
States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) on the situation in Vietnam,
Laird declaired his satisfactionwith the progress that had been made, both
in the war effort and in the South Vietnamese armed forces, and instructed
Abrams (commander od the MACV) to accelerate all programs turning over
the war to Saigon. He returned to Washington, and his determination to
effect a major change in American policy tward the war in Vietnam remained
fixed. In subsequent discussions with Nixon, Henry Kissenger (the president's
special assistant for national security, and the Joint Cheifs of Staff,
he pursued this goal vogorously, presently persuading the president to
embark on a policy of what he called "Vietnamization" -- turning the ground
war over to the South Vietnamese.
On April 10, Kissenger, with the approval of the president, directed
Laird to prepare a specific timetable for Vietnamizing the war. The plan
was to cover all aspects of U.S. military, para - military, and civilian
involvement in Vietnam, including combat and combat support forces, advisory
personnell, and all formes of equipment. Neither a further expansion of
the South Vietnamese armed forced nor the withdrawl of the North Vietnamese
Army was envisioned. Instead, through phased troop withdrawls, the American
military presence in Vietnam was to be reduced to a support and advisory
mission. Troop withdrawls were to begin July 1, 1969, with alternitive
completion dates of December 1970, June 1971, and December 1972. Kissenger
requested an initial overall report outline by June 1. Thus, despite the
divergent U.S. agencies involved in the war effort and despite the unanimous
opinion of these same agencies that the South Vietnamese could never deal
with a combined Viet Cong - North Vietnamese Army threat, the new administration
had instructed the American military command to develop plans for turning
over almost the entire ground war to the South Vietnamese. Tward the end
of 1969, the first American troops left Vietnam, never to return.
Withdrawl
The withdrawl of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam continued throughout
1971 and 1972 almost without a break in stride. American military strength
passed through the residual support phase sometime in 1971, and in April,
1972 MACV began planning for a possable total U.S. withdrawl as early as
November 1973. As american troops redeployed, Vietnamization, the expansion
of South Vietnamese military responsibilities, marched steadily forward.
The period was marked by heavy combat. South Vietnamese cross - border
operations into Cambodia and Laos in 1971 met stiff opposition, and in
early 1972 were countered by the North Vietnamese "Easter" offensive into
South Vietnam. Fighting was intense, casualties and equipment losses were
high, and the nature of the combat was more or less conventional. Guerrila
warfare behind South Vietnamese lines was negligable, while use of tanks,
long - range artillary, and sophisticated missles became commonplace. As
American combat units left South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese assumed
responsibility for the war, many advisors felt their work load increasing.
In September 1971, General Abrams (commander of the MACV) directed that
the current avvisory effort focus primarily on management of support programs
and revoltionary development. The Southe Vietnamese regulars, he felt,
were performing reasonably well in the field and needed little operational
advice. Assistance was most needed in areas of command and control, personnel,
logistics, training, communications, electronics, and in intelligence.
On the civilian side assistance was needed in areas of local self - defence,
self - government, and economic self - development. He also pointed out
that the advisory effort was not being slighted.
By the end of the year, 66 percent of the U.S. military forces would
have left Vietnam, while the total advisory effort would have only declined
22 percent. This would be primarily done by reducing the size and number
of the tactical detatchments. The combat assistance teams in the field
had began dissappearing even before 1972. With the exception of the airborne
advisors and some teams in the northern corps, MACV closed out all of the
battalion teams by June 30, 1971, and began phasing out the regimental
teams by September. By the end of the year, the U.S. Army tactictle advisory
strength had fallen from 5,416 to 3,888, and MACV staff strength from 1,894
to 1,395 and many were military cadre from leaving American units trying
to complete their twelve month tours.
During 1972 General Abrams, and his successor in June, General Fredrick
C. Wayand, threw the weight of the advisory effort into a succession of
material supply porjects that enabled the South Vietnamese to complete
existing modernization programs; to make up for heavy combat losses; to
create new units, and to fill their depots with munitions, fuel, spare
parts, and other supplies. The eventual result was a massivesea and airlift
between October 23 and December 12 1972 that brought over 105,000 major
items of equipment to South Vietnam, about 5,000 tons by air and the rest
by sea. In the field of supply the most critical and the most costly item
in the South Vietnamese inentory was ammunition. In 1972, under MACV guidance,
the Central Logistics Command established a more detailed system to moniter
the status of all munitions: base, field, and unit depot stockage; unit
expenditures; and ammunition maintenance. Unused ammunition was subject
to rapid deterioriation and had to examined periodically and , if necessary,
reconditioned of destroyed. Stockage levels in each ammunition category
were critical. Munitions stocks increased from 79,000 short tons in January
1969 to 146,900 in January 1972 and 165,700 in January 1973. However, a
normal monthly expenditure rate of 33,000 short tons, which could rise
to over 100,000 short tons per month in periods of intense combat, made
continued resupply by the United States vital.
Another potential problem was the vulnerability of ammunition dums;
the enemy had destroyed over 24,000 short tons of depot ammunition during
the Easter offensive alone. The South Vietnamese would have to maintain,
protect, and ration their existing stocks as carefully as possible. Following
the Easter offensive of 1972, MACV and the Joint Cheifs of Staff suddenly
decided that further additions had to be made. These included two more
M48 tank battalions; two additional air defence and three more 175-mm.
self - propelled artillery battallions; crews for one hundred sophisticated
antitank missle launchers; and, for the South Vietnamese Air Force, thirteen
aviation squadrons. The new air units represented a major expansion and
included aircraft for two more squadrons of heavy CH-47, three of A-37
jet fighter bombers, two of large C130 transports, and five of F5 jet fighters.
Perhaps anticipating some kind of agreement in Paris, the Department
of Defence agreed to ship this material to South Vietnam as soon as possable
under the code name Project ENHANCE and to raise and train units and crews
at some later date. At the same time, in order to strengthen the territorials,
MACV authorised more Regional Forces battalions and enlarged province tacticle
staffs to provide better command and control. To create these new units
without violating the 1.1 million troop ceiling, MACV and the Joint General
Staff again made compensatory reductions in Popular Forces strength. Fall
of Vietnam It took almost one year for the North Vietnamese to rebuild
their strength and launch their own major offensive. On March 30 1972 three
North Vietnamese Army divisions crossed the Demilitarised Zone in northern
South Vietnam, overrunning advance bases of the new South Vietnamese 3d
Division; three days later, three more enemy divisions headed south across
the Cambodian border twards Saigon, surrounding positions held by the 5th
Division in the III Corps Tacticle Zone, and two weeks after that, two
other divisions attacked the 22nd Infintry Division in the Highlands, while
smaller units struck at towns in Binh Dinh Province along the coast. Because
of the timing of the attacks, they were quickly called the "Easter Offensive."
Through all of this, the North Vietnamese had only won two district
towns, Loc Ninh, near the Cambodian border, and Dong Ha, opposite the Demilitarised
zone, a small showing for the heavy prices they paid. The ceasefire agreement
of January 23 1973 marked an end to the American policy of Vietnamization.
The agreement specified the complete withdrawl of all American military
forces from South Vietnam, including advisors, and the end of all U.S.
military actions in support of Saigon. The North Vietnamese, in turn, agreed
to put a ceasefire in place, the return of Amerocan Prisoners of War, and
an end to infiltration in the South. The accord caught many American generals
by suprise, including General Abrams, the new Army cheif of staff (Abrams
had stepped down as MACV commander on June 28 1972 to replace General Westmoreland
as the Army chief of staff, and the U.S. Senate confirmed the appointment
on October 12). He had felt that the United States would end up with some
type of permanent ground and air comittment similar to that in South Korea.
Instead, there was to be no residual support force, not even an advisory
mission, and, in theory, the Viet Cong and Saigon governments were to settle
their political differances at some later date.
The ceasefire began at 8 o'clock on Sunday, January 28 1973, and the
war ground to a temporary halt. In the sixty days that followed, slightly
over 58,000 forign troops departed South Vietnam, including about 23,000
Americans, 25,000 Koreans, and a few hundred assorted Thais, Fillipinos,
and Nationalist Chinese. Their leaving left about 550.000 South Vietnamese
regulars and another 525,0000 territorials to face a regular North Vietnamese
army that Americans estimated at 500,000 to 600,000 troops, of which about
220,000 were in South Vietnam and the rest close by. The final U.S. withdrawals
were timed to match the release of American prisoners of war by the North
Vietnam. MACV headquarters dissolved on March 29, and three new agencies
took over it's remaining functions. Thus ended the ill fated American involvement
in Vietnam.
In late 1973, the cease fire was broken by the sending of 18 divisions
from North Vietnam into the south. This, in time, would become one of the
worst blood baths of the war. This continued through 1975, when the enemy
came to be in near Saigon, and elements of the underground political opposition
came into the open and held meetings to voice their antigovernment feelings.
The government moved in and on March 27 1975, arrested a number of poeple
suspected of plotting a coup. On April 2 1975, the South Vietnamese Senate
even adopted a resolution holding President Thieu personnally responseable
for the detiorating situation and asking him to take immediate steps to
form a broader cabinet. It was speculated that to save what they could,
the government should send a plenipotentiary to Paris and ask the Fench
governmentto act as official intermediary in negotiations to be conducted
with the Communists. But President Thieu appeared only incredulous. Demands
that President Thieu should resign and transfer his powers at once to General
Duong Van Minh were resurrected in earnest. A coalition government led
by General Minh, it was said, stood a better chance of being accepted by
the Communists; if so, more bloodshed could be averted. On Monday April
21, during a meeting at Independance Palace, President Thieu announced
his decision to step down. He inferred that the United States wanted him
to resign, and whether or not he consented, certain generals would press
for a replacement. As required by the Constitution of South Vietnam, he
was prepared to transfer the presidency to Vice President Tran Van Huong.
Finally, he asked the armed forces and the national police to fully support
the new president. In the evening of April 21, 1975, the televised transfer
of power ceremony took place at Independance Palace. After President Huong
took over, he immediatly went about imposing certain forceful measures,
among which was a formal ban on all overseas travel. Servicemen and cival
servants who had fled to forign countries were ordered to return within
thirty days; if they failed to do so, their citizenship would be revoked,
and all their belongings confiscated. The only people that the new government
would allow to go overseas were the old and the ill; they were to be permitted
to seek treatment out of the country after posting a large bond (to say
nothing of the large bribes required to obtain such a pass).
In the meantime, the militry situation became increasingly bad. In the
afternoon of Sunday April 27 1975, the defence minister, Mr. Tran Van Don,
led a military delegation composed of general officers of Joint General
Staff and the commander of CMD in an apperance before a meeting before
both houses of Congress. By 7:30 pm, 138 senators and representatives were
present. Mr. Don summarized the military situation: Saigon was now surrounded
by fifteen enemy divisions under the control of three army corps. The Saigon
- Vung Tau Highway had been cut, and enemy troops were advancing tward
the Long Binh base. At 8:20 pm, the General Assembly voted to hand over
the presidency to General Minh. The next day, Monday April 28, 1975 at
5:30 pm, General Minh was sworn in as president. President Minh was much
more confident. He based his conviction of an eventual political arrangement
with the Communists on these ficts as he saw them: (1) The Communists did
not have a solid structure in Saigon - negotiations would provide more
time for solidation. (2) The provisional government was strongly anti -
Communist and the Communists preferred a "two Vietnams" solution. (3) It
was believed that Communist China preferred a divided Vietnam and a unified
Vietnam would pose a threat to China's border. Finally, "The Communists
know that the people of South Vietnam don't like Communism. Since it is
impossible for the Comminists to kill them all, it is to their advantage
to negotiate. So he firmly believed that a government with him at the head
would be more acceptable to the Communists, and that they would be willing
to negotiate with him for a political solution. President Minh waited in
vain for a favorable word from the other side, but none came. The response
of the Communists was omnious: they bombed Tan Son Nhut Air base the moment
he was sworn in, and shelled Saigon barely twelve hours later. Still a
last ditch effort was attempted by President Minh's people to contact the
Communists through their representative at Tan Son Nhut. But the answer
was evasive and intimidating. It was then that President Minh realised
that all hope was gone. He gave twenty - four hours for all U.S. personnel
to leave South Vietnam.
The evacuation proceeded ferverishly throughout the night and was over
at 5:00 am on April 30. At 10 :00 am on April 30,1975, President Minh ordered
the armed forces to stop fighting, and gave in to all Communist demands.
And the Republic of South Vietname came under Communist control and no
longer existed as a free nation.
Conclusion
The United States policy of Vietnamization was a good idea, but the
time was not ripe for it to best be used. Saigon's military strength was
rated by nearly all experts in South Vietnam as uncapable of handleing
a combined threat. True, Vietnamization was not what led to the total withdrawl
of troops from Vietnam, but the opinions pressed by Laird had somewhat
of an affect on our agreeing to sign a ceasefire agreement. Also, if we
had used Vietnamization's program of building up South Vietnam's armed
forces more extensively, South Vietnam might still be in existance today.
